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Abstract—The industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) is having
a significant impact in the manufacturing industry, especially
in the context of horizontal integration of operational systems
in factories as part of information systems in supply chains.
Manufacturing companies can use this technology to create
data streams along the supply chain that monitor and con-
trol manufacturing and logistic processes, to in the end make
these data streams interoperable with other software systems
and to enable smart interactions among supply chain processes.
However, the provision of these data streams may expose
manufacturing operational systems to cyber-attacks. Therefore,
cybersecurity is a critical aspect to design trustworthy gateways,
which are system components that implement interoperabil-
ity mechanisms between operational systems and information
systems. Gateways must provide security mechanisms at dif-
ferent system layers to minimize threats. This paper presents
the Device Drivers security architecture: trustworthy gateways
between operational technology and information technology used
in the virtual factory open operating system (vf-OS) platform,
which is a multisided platform orientated to manufacturing and
logistics companies to enable collaboration among supply chains
in all sectors. The main contribution of this paper is the evalua-
tion of fallback mechanisms to improve resilience. In situations
when the system may be under attack, the proposed mecha-
nisms provide means to quickly recover component availability,
by applying alternative security measures to minimize the threat
at the same time. Other significant contributions are: a descrip-
tion of the threat model for Device Drivers, a presentation of the
security countermeasures implemented in the vf-OS system, the
mapping of the vf-OS response objectives to the different char-
acteristics of a trustworthy system: security, privacy, reliability,
safety, and resilience and how the proposed countermeasures
complement this response.
Index Terms—Application virtualization, communication
system security, industrial communications.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE INDUSTRY 4.0 [1] concepts and technologies out-line the future approach to supply chain operations. In
this new scenario, smart products, smart equipment, software,
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Fig. 1. vf-OS platform.
and people interact to dynamically optimize operations, based
on real time analytics and supply chain process automa-
tion. One of the backbones of this vision is the industrial
Internet of Things (IIoT) [2]. This technology enables the
creation of data streams throughout the production process
(i.e., vertical integration) and among supply chains (i.e., hori-
zontal integration) that can be used to monitor manufacturing
assets and/or value streams in real time. In combination with
other technologies like cloud storage, data analytics, big data,
virtualization [3], or microservices architecture they provide
the basis for gaining predictive insights in any supply chain
process [1], from customer relationship management, through
manufacturing flow management, to returns management [4].
Some of the applications of these technologies are to support
the transition from product-centric to service-centric business
models in manufacturing, waste reductions for lean manufac-
turing operations or support to collaborative manufacturing.
Interoperable digital manufacturing platforms [5] and
ecosystems, such as the virtual factory open operating system
(vf-OS) platform [6], are multisided platforms that address
manufacturing and logistic companies. vf-OS enables the
exploitation of Industry 4.0 technologies through a range
of services to integrate better manufacturing and logistics
processes within organizations and among supply networks.
The vf-OS platform concept is illustrated in Fig. 1.
The value proposition for the different customer groups of
the multisided platform is clear.
1) Manufacturing users can select and use vApps from
the marketplace to integrate manufacturing and logis-
tics processes, enabling collaboration in the value chain.
If they do not find any suitable applications for their
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
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Fig. 2. Device driver high level architecture.
needs, they can demand new solutions to be developed
to software developers.
2) Software developers gain access to a new and high-
growth potential market of applications for Industry 4.0
and factories of the future.
3) Manufacturing solutions providers that deliver products
and services to manufacturing users have new ways for
collaborating and interacting with their customers and
provide added value.
4) Service providers can provide new services (hosting,
storage, cloud services, etc.) to realize the vf-OS
ecosystem.
Within the vf-OS system architecture, certain components
have been designed to interact with all kinds of manufac-
turing assets, both physical devices (e.g., PLCs or sensors)
and business software applications [7] (e.g., ERPs or CRMs).
These components, known as input–output (IO) components,
make up the virtual factory I/O and implement interoperability
mechanisms that are specifically addressed to manufacturing
processes.
In particular, Device Drivers are components designed to
interconnect physical devices to the vf-OS platform as shown
in Fig. 2. They can be regarded as gateway components with
secured core functionalities to integrate physical devices into
the vf-OS platform. Device Drivers interact with physical
devices through what is known as bottom interfaces. They
implement inner logic functions (e.g., edge processing) and
the vf-OS platform interacts with Device Drivers through
top interfaces. Likewise, API connectors are components to
interconnect on premise software to the vf-OS platform.
Cybersecurity mechanisms must be implemented both in the
design and the execution of every component functionality. To
that end, vf-OS provides the vf-OS holistic security and pri-
vacy concept, which is the framework for all security counter-
measures in the vf-OS ecosystem. This research describes how
the vf-OS response applies to the security of Device Drivers
and proposes complementary countermeasures which can be
used to further improve system trustworthiness. This paper is
structured as follows. Section II describes the main security
concepts taken into account in the design of vf-OS Device
Drivers. Section III describes the complementary countermea-
sures proposed in this paper, which are based on the fallback
principle. Finally, Section IV includes some final conclusions.
II. SECURITY CONCEPTS
The Device Drivers that implement interoperability mech-
anisms with industrial control system (ICS) components
represent a very critical environment from a security perspec-
tive, since cyber-attacks may not only cause great economic
losses to manufacturing companies, but may also pose a risk
for operators or the environment. The confidentiality, integrity,
and availability triad model is a classic model to guide infor-
mation security policies within an organization. It can be
noted that the priorities of operational systems and informa-
tion systems regarding these system characteristics are not the
same. Moreover, [8] provides a more elaborated definition of
the system characteristics that enable system trustworthiness
and the different priorities for information systems, opera-
tional systems, and IIoT systems integrating both. From this
perspective, Device Drivers can be regarded as IIoT system
components, as they combine the requirements and regula-
tory constraints of both information technology (IT) systems
and operational technology (OT) systems regarding the system
characteristics that enable trustworthiness.
1) Security: Security ensures that the system is protected
from unintended or unauthorized access, change, or
destruction.
2) Privacy: Privacy provides organizations control over the
collection, processing, and storage of their information,
by deciding how this information can be shared both
within their own organization and with others.
3) Reliability: Reliability guarantees that the system’s oper-
ation is uninterrupted and error-free for the specified
time. Availability is related to reliability, but also takes
into account planned operation stops.
4) Safety: System Safety ensures that the people, property
and environment are not at any unacceptable risk during
the system’s operation.
5) Resilience: System resilience [8] provides means to
dynamically avoid, absorb and rapidly recover from
changing adverse conditions. Resilience includes the
ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks,
accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents.
The combination of IT environments and OT environments
means that Device Drivers have increased requirements for
each system’s trustworthiness characteristic compared to either
OT or IT systems. This is presented in Fig. 3. Compared to tra-
ditional IT environments, Device Drivers have increased safety
and resilience requirements, because they must also comply
with the requirements of operational environments. Operation
safety and availability have higher priority requirements in
OT environments, due to the potential damage of an inci-
dent and the high costs of operation downtimes. This means
that trustworthy Device Drivers need to implement safety
and resiliency mechanisms to guarantee operations. However,
traditional OT environments are rather isolated silos where
physical separation and network isolation protect sensitive or
vulnerable components and therefore security or privacy have
lower priorities compared to IT systems. Since Device Drivers
bridge the operational environment with the IT environment,
this separation no longer exists and it is necessary to imple-
ment mechanisms to ensure system trustworthiness. Therefore,
in Device Drivers, all these requirements converge and it is
necessary to implement mechanisms to support all system
trustworthiness characteristics.
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Fig. 3. Device driver trustworthiness.
IIoT system trustworthiness involves a range of activities
and technologies that encompass the entire lifecycle of its
components. These activities are guided by state-of-the-art
cybersecurity frameworks, which are mostly based on inter-
national standards and known best-practices proven effective
in operational environments. The industrial Internet consor-
tium cybersecurity framework [8], the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST) framework for infrastruc-
ture cybersecurity [9], and the European Union Agency for
Network and Information Security baseline security recom-
mendations for IoT are examples of cybersecurity frameworks
for IIoT systems. On the other hand, [11] and [12] provide
exhaustive descriptions of the state-of-the-art in standard-
ization and certification for Industry 4.0 and IIoT systems,
including an analysis of the maturity and the relationships
between these standards. Furthermore, [11] describes and com-
pares different categories of standards relevant in the context
of interoperable digital manufacturing platforms: standards for
Industry 4.0 and ICS like ISA/IEC 62443 [13], standards for
secure software development like the OWASP [14] and stan-
dards and schemes for IoT vendors, like the OWASP Internet
of Things project [18].
The vf-OS holistic security and privacy concept response
builds on these standards to respond to the main threats in the
interoperable digital manufacturing platform ecosystem and
implement system trustworthiness. To present the vf-OS secu-
rity response for Device Drivers, Section II-A first presents
the threat model and then Section II-B presents the security
architecture of Device Drivers.
A. Threat Model
A threat model is an engineering technique to identify
the threats, attacks, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures that
affect the targeted system. The threat model used in this paper
is the spoofing, tampering, repudiation, information disclo-
sure, elevation of privilege (STRIDE) threat model developed
by Microsoft to evaluate potential security risks [15]. Within
the vf-OS system architecture, Device Driver attackers can be
roughly categorized into two groups. The first group is people
who have legitimate access rights to the vf-OS Platform (i.e.,
software developers, manufacturing providers, or manufactur-
ing users). This user group is called insiders. The second group
contains malicious third parties that do not participate in the
vf-OS platform, otherwise known as outsiders. The following
list applies the STRIDE threat model to Device Drivers from
the manufacturing users’ standpoint and analyzes the main
potential threats, including example attack scenarios.
1) Spoofing Identity: Spoofing is the illegal access and use
of authentication information, such as username and
password. If an insider gets legitimate credentials to
Device Driver services by some means, the insider may
be able to operate the physical device in an illegiti-
mate way, or steal sensitive operational data on premise.
Likewise, an outsider can obtain the credentials (e.g.,
via phishing) and attempt to operate the Device Driver
in the vf-OS platform via the Internet. Hajime is an
example of this threat [16].
2) Data Tampering: Data tampering consists of malicious
data modifications, both unauthorized changes to data at
rest (persistent data) and alterations to data in transit
(data as it flows between two computers over an open
network, such as the Internet). The major data tamper-
ing threat for data at rest comes from insiders. Software
developers and manufacturing providers could embed
malicious code in vApps or Device Drivers in the devel-
opment stage or over a version upgrade. Manufacturing
users could make modifications that can compromise the
operation of the device. Other software marketplace plat-
forms are vulnerable to this threat [17]. Manufacturing
providers can also tamper the firmware of the con-
trol devices, for instance during maintenance operations.
Outsiders may alter data in transit in the connection to
the vf-OS platform (through the top interfaces), but also
in the connection to the physical device.
3) Repudiation: Repudiation happens when the system is
not able to adequately track users’ actions. As a result,
authorized users can be denied the right to perform
authorized actions without the means to prove so other-
wise or malicious users can log their actions on behalf
of others. Nonrepudiation refers to the system’s abil-
ity to counter repudiation threats. In the context of
vf-OS, the main repudiation threat is related to legit-
imate changes to configuration and logging data. For
instance, a manufacturing user finds out that the config-
uration for a specific sensor is deleted and blames the
software developer who had just performed an upgrade.
However, the software developer states that the upgrade
had no effect on the sensor’s configuration data. In this
situation, the system needs evidence that confirms what
actually happened, so that there is no conflict between
both stakeholders. For instance, log injection attacks
represent a repudiation threat [18].
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4) Information Disclosure: Exposing information to indi-
viduals who are not supposed to have access to it.
Multiple manufacturing users are connected to the vf-OS
platform. They do not know the internal vf-OS plat-
form configuration, but it certainly shares resources with
other companies. Sensitive information may be leaked
to providers, customers, or even competitors. The target
data breach is an example of this threat [19].
5) Denial of Service (DoS): DoS represents the threat of
attackers to exploit the limited capacity of a system
component to respond to unauthorized access requests.
According to the cloud security alliance, distributed
DoS (DDoS) is one of the top nine threats to cloud
computing environments [16]. An outsider may do DoS
or DDoS attacks to a device driver to disable it. Insiders
may perform DoS attacks as well, but this kind of
attacks may be easier to prevent. Permanent denial of
service is another DoS attack that targets unsecured IIoT
devices [20].
6) Elevation of Privilege: Elevation of privilege refers to
the ability of an unprivileged user to gain privileged
access and compromise or destroy the entire system.
Insiders represent the main elevation of privilege threat,
which stems from users with legitimate access rights
who make changes to the configuration that compromise
the system.
Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that the threat
model cannot foresee all possible threats and thus, all
systems are vulnerable to zero day attacks, which are cyber-
attacks that exploit security holes or vulnerabilities that
were not foreseen during the design of the system secu-
rity architecture. For instance, the Stuxnet attack exploited
four different zero day vulnerabilities on nuclear plants in
Iran [21]. Therefore, and as in this example, new vulnerabil-
ities may be used and existing security measures may prove
ineffective.
B. Device Driver Security Architecture
As a response to the different threats in the ecosystem,
the vf-OS holistic security and privacy concept architec-
ture provides a layered security approach to reduce the
vulnerability surface of system components. As explained
above, possible use scenarios of Device Drivers have strict
requirements for system trustworthiness. Therefore, organi-
zations need a comprehensive security response with effec-
tive countermeasures to secure the system. Table I summa-
rizes the vf-OS response objectives for each system layer.
Based on NIST guidelines [9], security measures need to
be implemented into four phases for the life cycle of
the response to the attack: 1) preparation; 2) detection
and analysis; 3) containment eradication and recovery; and
4) post-incident activity. The following sections describe the
main techniques and processes to comply with the response
requirements.
1) Security Procedures: Regarding procedures, vf-OS pro-
vides security guidelines and procedures in the preparation
phase of the security measures implemented at all layers to
deliver trustworthy Device Drivers.
TABLE I
vf-OS HOLISTIC AND PRIVACY CONCEPT LAYERS
Design and installation procedures of Device Drivers com-
ply with cybersecurity standards from both IT and OT
systems to ensure system trustworthiness. In particular, the
vf-OS security and privacy concept adopts the ISA/IEC-
62443 standard [13] for the development of secure industrial
system components. ISA/IEC-62243 provides technical secu-
rity requirements for OT system components at different
levels. Currently, there are security certifications in alignment
with this standard and with its adoption, vf-OS ensures that it
can meet the requirements of the most challenging scenarios
from a security point of view. In addition to this, vf-OS also
adopts the OWASP secure Web service development practices
for the development of the RESTful application programming
interfaces (APIs) used by vf-OS components. vf-OS also incor-
porates key points of the NIST cybersecurity framework [9].
Accordingly, Device Drivers must implement the vf-OS spe-
cific system cryptographic techniques and configurations into
their software.
In order to protect the integrity of the roots of trust, i.e.,
the components that are inherently trusted, only certificates
from accepted certificate authorities can be used to issue the
required digital signatures for Device Drivers to be published
in the marketplace.
Regarding the secure installation of Device Drivers, the
network needs to comply with the ISA/IEC 62443 secure
network definitions. Manufacturing users must follow the
industrial device installation procedures defined in the
ISA/IEC 62443 standard to install vf-OS software on their
premises. Additional security procedures and cryptographic
techniques like encryption guarantee the security of the data at
rest in the Device Driver. The vf-OS system needs to be com-
patible with the ISA/IEC 62443 secure network definitions, so
that Device Drivers can be installed in factories that implement
this standard.
In order to protect the integrity of operations, in the detec-
tion and analysis phase, the vf-OS security command center
enables continuous security monitoring, allowing to manage
the configurations of the intrusion detection systems (IDSs)
and security information and event management systems
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deployed in the network to detect intrusions or abnormal com-
ponent behavior. The vf-OS security command center can use
this information to adjust the system to prevent the perceived
security threat. In this sense, Device Drivers implement secu-
rity event data logging and monitoring to collect and store
security related data.
2) Application Security: For Application layer security,
apart from the above described secure software development
procedures, Device Drivers are signed with PKI device driver
certificates issued by vf-OS accepted certificate authorities, to
guarantee software integrity and to prevent any altered Device
Drivers from running in any vf-OS Platform instance.
The system also implements a role-based access control—
attribute-based access control (RBAC-ABAC) system to
restrict access to assets and data, by allowing users to define
precise access rules to Device Drivers to ensure confidential-
ity. This way, vf-OS adopts a centralized administration of the
RBAC-ABAC system in the vf-OS security command center.
The main advantages of this approach are to reduce the pos-
sibility of error in Device Driver implementations, to improve
the response time in case of a security breach, to enforce uni-
formity across multiple stakeholders and to reduce the risk of
nonrepudiation.
3) Communication Security: All data communications are
secured using standard security recommendations for trans-
port layer security (TLS) and data encryption using TLS [28]
based network encryption for the vf-OS PKI infrastructure.
Communications integrity and confidentiality is achieved by
mutual authentication between system components. The vf-OS
security center provides centralized control over authentication
and communication between components. Components login
against the vf-OS security command center, which generates
a security token based on the user credentials. The vf-OS
security command center acts as a reverse security proxy and
intercepts all communications between components. The per-
missions are checked and the connection is forwarded to the
destination component only if two conditions are fulfilled.
The signed application configuration data must specify that
the application can use the component resources and the user
must be allowed to perform the operation. This centraliza-
tion ensures that all components implement the same security
controls over communications.
4) Network Security: Regarding the network layer, vf-OS
adopts the secured network architecture concepts of ISA/IEC-
62443 to protect ICS networks. According to this strategy, the
network is divided into segments or levels using Firewalls.
Each system component is connected to a specific seg-
ment according to its functionality. There are levels for IT
systems, called enterprise levels, and levels for operational
systems, called industrial levels. Applications and systems
that interconnect separate levels are managed through demil-
itarized zone (DMZ) segments, applying what is known as
a defence in-depth strategy, which has proven to be an effective
technique to ensure network integrity against cyber-attacks.
vf-OS applies the ISA/IEC-62443 principles to the integra-
tion of operational systems distributed in supply chains to
guarantee architectural availability, with techniques to min-
imize the threat of DDoS attacks, data tampering and to
Fig. 4. Small scale horizontal integration.
increase the system reliability. In this sense, there are two
main deployment scenarios for Device Drivers depending on
whether or not they connect to the physical device through an
Internet connection: small-scale horizontal integration scenar-
ios where Device Drivers do not connect to physical devices
through the Internet and large-scale horizontal integration
scenarios where they do.
To understand better the defense in-depth strategy,
Fig. 4 illustrates a hypothetical example where an SME manu-
facturing provider—which delivers industrial devices—would
like to use the vf-OS platform to provide added value services,
in a new strategy to sell products-as-a-service or solution-as-a-
service rather than standalone products. The vApps integrates
its corporate software with the industrial devices at its cus-
tomers’ premises via Device Drivers. The vf-OS platform is
installed on a private cloud connected to the manufacturing
provider corporate network to leverage the vf-OS services
and applications as an extension of their corporate software.
The vApps that provide added-value services run into a pub-
licly available subnet (DMZ), so that they are accessible to
customers from the Internet.
Their customers can download from the vf-OS marketplace
the required Device Driver and install it on premise. Some
customers may already have a secured ICS network and there-
fore, they wish to install the Device Driver in the industrial
level 2 (manufacturing operations) DMZ. The Device Driver
interconnects with the vf-OS platform through intermediary
components called security agents which are installed in the
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Fig. 5. Large scale horizontal integration.
DMZs between levels and basically act as security prox-
ies. This way, the vf-OS platform can send to and receive
data from the industrial device via the Device Driver follow-
ing the ISA/IEC secure network architecture design principles.
However, some other customers may not have a secured
network architecture in place. In these cases, the Device Driver
can connect to the vf-OS platform using a virtual private
network (VPN) connection to seamlessly integrate the indus-
trial device into the private network of the manufacturing
provider and still provide a secured network environment. The
Device Driver embeds the VPN client and configuration files
to establish this connection, so that it is transparent for the
end user.
In both cases, each Device Driver acts as a concentrator that
gathers the data from the different industrial devices deployed
in each factory. The customer is in control of the configuration
of the access permissions and decides what data is shared with
the manufacturing provider. Device Drivers must also imple-
ment redundancy to improve availability. This also applies to
the rest of network components (like firewalls and switches).
In large scale horizontal integration scenarios, Device
Drivers connect to physical devices using secured IIoT com-
munication protocols. This is suitable when the number of
devices that need to be integrated is very large and/or geo-
graphically scattered. In this scenario, Device Drivers are orga-
nized in geo-correlated clusters, implementing redundancy,
and load balancing to improve availability.
5) Device Driver Security: Device Drivers can implement
additional security mechanisms to improve system trustwor-
thiness, in particular reliability and resilience.
Device Drivers can keep a short term historic of the device
data in a local database. In case the Device Driver is dis-
connected from the vf-OS platform, it is possible to recover
otherwise lost data from this short term historic, thus improv-
ing fault tolerance and reliability. In this sense, Device driver
local storage is encrypted to ensure the integrity of data in rest.
Additionally, as mentioned above it is important to imple-
ment redundancy mechanisms to Device Drivers to avoid
points of system failure in both deployment scenarios.
Resilience can be achieved by implementing smart fallback
mechanisms where the redundant Device Drivers introduce
changes to the system in order to adapt to a possible threat.
This smart fallback mechanism is presented in the next section.
III. SMART FALLBACK MECHANISM
The vf-OS holistic privacy and security concept effectively
provides security mechanisms at the different layers to imple-
ment system trustworthiness. However, it is not possible to
foresee all possible threats when designing a system and the
threat of zero day vulnerabilities always prevails. In this sense,
the purpose of the security architecture described so far is to
detect and protect the system against attacks. It is also impor-
tant to take countermeasures on the premise that security will
be broken. In both the Device Driver and Device layers in the
Table I, resilience and safety must be taken into account in the
design of the security architecture. More specifically, resilience
means that in the event of an attack, the Device Driver must
recover operations as soon as possible, while at the same time
try to minimize the risk of persisting or propagating attacks.
Since the Device Driver is the last gateway leading to the OT
system, it is important to provide these resilient mechanisms
herein.
The proposal presented in this paper is based on the imple-
mentation of fallback mechanisms for Device Drivers that are
activated in case of emergency, when an IDS detects a pos-
sible attack at this layers or the Device Driver stops working
normally. It is always important to keep a fallback system for
emergency. The fallback is an alternative system used in case of
an unplanned outage. Creating a fallback means creating a copy,
therefore the normal system and fallback system have exactly
the same configuration (boot files, program files, data storage,
etc.). This allows an administrator to recover quickly even in
case of emergency. In terms of security, however, this allows an
attacker to attack the same system in the same way by using the
same vulnerability or passing the same authentication. For this
reason, this proposal introduces diversity in the fallback system
of the Device Driver. Thus, in case of an unplanned outage or
a detected intrusion, instead of restoring the exact Device Driver
runtime configuration, the proposed smart fallback mechanism
introduces diversity on different runtime features with two
objectives. First, the changes are aimed to make it harder for
the attackers to persist in the attack, assuming that the zero-day
vulnerability they are exploiting does not hold for all possible
runtime configurations. The second objective is to increase the
level of protection of the operational system, at least momentar-
ily until the system is back to a normal state (i.e., the attack is
over). This security improvement of the fallback systems comes
at the expense of decreasing to some extent the functionality
of the Device Driver.
A. Runtime Configuration Diversity in Fallback Mechanism
This section describes the different options for introduc-
ing diversity in the runtime configuration of Device Drivers.
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Fig. 6. OS diversity.
The effectiveness of these fallback mechanisms have been
validated through simulations. The simulation environment
implements a virtual network composed of a field network
level and a Device Driver network level. The Device Driver
and Device Driver smart fallback prototypes used in the simu-
lations are implemented with Node-Red [23] flows and it uses
Modbus TCP [24] to communicate with field devices. The
attacks are simulated using the Kali Linux [25] penetration
testing tool and the Nmap security scanner [26]. To simulate
the IDS system and smart fallback, a network scan in the
Device Driver or the field device network segments triggers
a change in the configuration of the Node-Red runtime of the
Device Driver, to switch the default Device Driver Node-Red
flow to the Device Driver fallback flow. The next sections
describe the different smart fallback mechanisms proposed.
1) Operating System Diversity: Let us assume that an
attacker managed to break all vf-OS security mechanisms and
ultimately gained control of the Device Driver. The attack on
the Device Driver is based on a previously unknown vul-
nerability of the underlying operating system (OS). Many
attacks exploit OS vulnerabilities. For instance, support for
Windows XP ended in April 8, 2014 [27], however, many
enterprises are still using this OS in the control system with-
out updating. This OS has the famous vulnerability called
ms08_067_netapi, which allows remote code execution [28].
In this situation, making changes in the OS configuration
of the Fallback Device Driver may overcome the unknown
vulnerability, or at least present a new hurdle for attack-
ers to persist in the attack. This might earn enough time to
restore system security and stop the attack, since attackers
cannot anticipate the OS configuration of the fallback system.
Device Drivers are containerized components and, in order to
implement OS diversity, they implement OS-level virtualiza-
tion methods, such as clear containers [29] that isolate the OS
kernel of each component. This concept is illustrated in Fig. 6.
2) Network Diversity: Network configuration of the Device
Driver is another possible element that can be changed to the
different configuration easily when switching to the Fallback
Device Driver. The example is illustrated in Fig. 7. This is the
most basic example. The normal Device Driver connects to
the physical device with the network 192.168.10.0/24 and the
fallback connects to it with the network 192.168.20.0/24. The
Fallback Device Drive always connects to the physical device
to have runtime data from physical device so that operators
switch at any time in emergency. It does not connect to the top
interfaces to isolate it from the threat of invasion via the top
interfaces. The network 192.168.20.0/24 is normally separated
Fig. 7. Network diversity.
Fig. 8. Network diversity with honeypot.
from any other systems. By changing the IP address, attackers
have to scan the network. This diversity itself may not be so
effective against an attack, however, in the sense of having
many diversity, this also makes some time to restore system
security and it presents a new hurdle for attackers to persist
in the attack. This is just changing IP address and therefore,
it is also possible to introduce this kind of network diversity
in vf-OS components quite easily.
It is also possible to have a system structure as illustrated in
Fig. 8. In addition to simply switching networks like the exam-
ple in Fig. 7, this system structure activates a Device Driver as
a honeypot [30] which does not actually connect to the phys-
ical device. A honeypot is a system imitating a vulnerable
system, which attracts attackers and bypasses possible attacks
against genuine devices that are in use. It enables collecting
logs of attack activities and analyzing the attack method based
on the logs. This technique has been commonly practiced in
IT [30].
This way, the honeypot Device Driver connects to a plant
simulator in the same subnet as the normal Device Driver
configuration, whereas the actual connection to the device is
switched to a Fallback Device Driver like in the previous
example. The plant simulator had previously used data col-
lected from actual physical devices to emulate the actual
plant. Since this simulator data may be exposed, it needs to
be processed to protect sensitive information. The network
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Fig. 9. Configuration diversity.
192.168.10.0/24 is completely isolated. The plant simulator
has the same IP address as the physical device as if it were
the genuine plant. Attackers might think the plant simulator is
the actual plant and this system makes attackers stuck in the
network 192.168.10.0/24. This system achieves both objectives
1 and 2.
3) Gateway Configuration Diversity: Regarding resilience,
in order to recover the control systems from the cyber-attacks
as soon as possible, it is necessary to prevent the physical
device from being affected by the cyber-attacks. A cyber-
attacker can only attack devices that are connected to the
network and as discussed, network isolation is an effective
security measure to protect operational systems. Therefore,
isolating the target from the network is the best way to prevent
the cyber-attacks to reach the operational level.
The best way to protect physical device from the threat
of cyber-attacks is just pull out the cable connecting to the
network. However, in the vf-OS Platform, if the physical
devices are completely separated from the network, engi-
neers cannot do remote monitoring and data cannot be sent
to the vf-OS Platform. Therefore, in order to ensure the
minimum productivity of the factory, authors propose the
architecture illustrated in Fig. 9. The normal Device Driver
allows communication from the Top Interfaces to the Bottom
Interfaces as well as the opposite way. It is possible to send
data from the Bottom Interfaces to the top interfaces (Read),
and send an instruction from the top interfaces to the bottom
interfaces (Write). This enables normal operation of vf-OS. On
the contrary, the Fallback Device Driver only allows Read.
When the attack is done or if something like cyber-attacks
are suspected, the system switches the Device Driver to the
fallback Device Driver. This makes it possible to prevent the
physical devices from being affected by cyber-attacks more
and secure the safety of the physical devices by not allowing
attackers to write or change configurations of the controller.
However, the fallback still can do Read and store the infor-
mation in a short-term historic, therefore the manufacturing
users can gather data and secure minimal productivity. While
the Fallback Device Driver is operating, field engineers operate
the factory manually.
IV. CONCLUSION
Industrial IoT gateway are critical components of inter-
operability platforms that integrate operational systems and
information systems. This paper has presented the main threats
and the security response in the design and implementation of
Device Drivers, which are the vf-OS platform components that
interact with manufacturing physical devices.
This paper has presented the different security mechanisms
to realize system trustworthiness. In addition to the secu-
rity mechanisms provided by the vf-OS holistic security and
privacy concept, authors propose a mechanism for reinforc-
ing resilience in the Device Driver layer to realize a system
that can reduce the damage in the event of attack and can
restore Device Driver operation immediately. The mechanism
is based on the fallback principle: the fallback is an alter-
native system used when the operation of the component is
compromised. The proposed smart fallback mechanism applies
different diversity mechanisms to change the configuration
of the fallback system in order to respond to various and
unexpected situations.
Device Drivers act as a gateway connecting the vf-OS
Platform and the physical device. In the event of a cyberattack
targeting field devices via the network, the Device Driver is
the last gateway leading to the physical devices. Therefore,
when the prepared security breaks down, it is critical to build
a resilient mechanism to contain the threat.
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